Institutional assimilation in the wake of EU competition law decentralisation by Van Cleynenbreugel, P.J.M.M.
  ISSN 1745-638X (Online) 
THE COMPETITION LAW REVIEW 
Volume 8 Issue 3 pp 285-312 December 2012 
Institutional Assimilation in the Wake of EU Competition Law Decentralisation 
Pieter Van Cleynenbreugel* 
  
This contribution outlines and evaluates the emergence of judicially mandated ‘institutional 
assimilation’ in EU competition law. It argues that the European Court of Justice’s 2010 Vebic 
judgment reflects a new assimilation approach to national institutional autonomy in the realm of 
decentralised EU competition law enforcement. According to that approach, the Court 
considers itself directly competent to determine the institutional outlook of national 
competition authorities called upon to apply EU competition law. Whilst an institutional 
assimilation approach enhances the uniform application image of EU competition law across 
the Member States, it also incorporates important new legitimacy concerns that warrant 
resolution. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The decentralised enforcement of EU competition law has been a significant factor in 
stimulating gradual convergence among national competition law regimes in Europe.1 
The European Court of Justice2 has been instrumental in turning convergence efforts 
into reality.3 Recent case law moved beyond classical understandings of convergence by 
imposing specific institutional requirements on the operations of national competition 
law enforcement structures. In so doing, the Court directly envisaged the ‘institutional 
assimilation’ of national competition law enforcement structures to a supranationally 
attuned image. 
This contribution analyses the Court’s ‘institutional assimilation’ approach and assesses 
its impact on the traditional convergence narrative. It proceeds in three consecutive 
parts. Section two outlines the scope of judicially mandated institutional assimilation. It 
argues that the Court of Justice directly required adaptations from national competition 
law enforcement structures in its 2010 Vebic judgment. This section subsequently 
hypothesises that the approach adopted in that judgment reflects a more general 
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1  See A. Gerbrandy, ‘Procedural Convergence in Competition Law. Towards a Spontaneous Ius Commune?’, 
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institutional assimilation framework supporting the decentralised application of EU 
competition law. Section three substantiates that hypothesis. It sketches the traditional 
‘due process’ convergence narrative and the ways in which institutional evolutions 
invite reconsideration of that narrative. It highlights recent Commission procedural 
reforms and connects these reforms to national institutional organisation equivalents to 
illustrate the assimilation argument. Section four evaluates the impact of a new 
‘institutional assimilation’ narrative from a legitimacy point of view. Institutional 
assimilation on the one hand broadens the scope of legitimacy analysis in EU 
competition law enforcement, but on the other creates new legitimacy problems the 
Court should – and could – take seriously in order to proceed along its Vebic line of 
reasoning. 
2. COURT-INDUCED INSTITUTIONAL ASSIMILATION 
This section argues that the ‘brave new world’4 of decentralised application of the 
prohibitions in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU provided the Court of Justice with an 
unprecedented opportunity to intervene in the organisation of national competition law 
enforcement structures. Not only did the Court read into the system of decentralisation 
as outlined in Regulation 1/2003 an invitation directly to assess concrete national 
institutional arrangements in the service of effective decentralised competition law 
enforcement, it additionally developed new institutional functioning principles that 
govern the organisation and operation of these national competition law arrangments. 
The 2010 Vebic judgment has been most significant in that regard. 
2.1. Enabling assimilation: Vebic and the system of decentralisation 
The present system of decentralised EU competition law enforcement completes two 
decades of proposals, notices and judgments enabling national competition authorities 
and private individuals directly to rely on EU competition law provisions.5 Regulation 
1/2003 reflects a culmination point in that respect, obliging national authorities and 
courts to apply EU competition law.6 The application and incorporation of EU 
competition law in a national setting was said to promote a ‘spontaneous 
harmonisation’ or convergence among national regimes.7 Three provisions in 
Regulation 1/2003 specifically nurture or facilitate spontaneous convergence. First, 
Article 3 mandates national competition authorities to apply EU competition law 
whenever they apply national law to agreements affecting interstate trade. In addition, 
the application of national law may not result in the prohibition of agreements that 
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would be permitted as a matter of EU competition law.8 That provision requires the 
scope of prohibited restrictive practices to be similar and therefore converging at the 
EU and national levels.9 Second, Article 11(6) allows the Commission to relieve a 
national competition authority of its powers to apply EU competition law by 
continuing the investigation or prosecution itself. As a result of that provision, the 
Commission not only establishes itself as a primus super pares,10 but also presupposes 
national institutional structures that are capable of being relieved.11 Third, Article 16(1) 
requires national courts to comply with Commission decisions and to assess whether or 
not to stay proceedings in cases where the Commission is about to adopt a decision. 
That provision envisages converging procedural mechanisms allowing national judges 
to stay proceedings as a matter of national law in order to comply with EU law 
obligations. 
In its case law on the application of Regulation 1/2003, the Court refined or interpreted 
these and other provisions and confirmed the taste for convergence reflected therein. 
The Court recurrently highlights ‘the objective of a uniform application of Articles [101 
TFEU] and [102 TFEU]’12 and uses that benchmark as a starting point for 
convergence. The need for uniform EU competition law application allows both the 
Court of Justice and the General Court to refine the system of concurrent application 
of EU and national law and to engage national legal systems in the service of 
maintaining a supranationally established competition law system. As a result of that 
position, the Courts mandated national courts to allow Commission interventions in 
national procedures only remotely related to EU competition law,13 allowed the 
Commission to conduct inspections even after a national authority had been called 
upon to deal with the case at hand,14 imposed obligations on national courts to 
maintain a presumption of causality between specific types of behaviour and 
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14  Case T-340/07, Evropaïki Dynamiki v. Commission, [2010] ECR II-16, para 129. 
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anticompetitive practices15 and allowed national authorities to continue national 
proceedings only after the Commission concluded its own proceedings.16 National 
authorities on the other hand were prohibited from adopting a general decision holding 
that a particular restrictive practice does not infringe EU law.17 
A most significant ‘uniform application’ interpretation emerged in the Vebic judgment.18 
At stake in that case was the confusing organisation of the Belgian national competition 
authority. The authority comprises two parts, an administrative Competition Service 
attached to the Belgian Federal Public Service and an independent administrative court, 
the Competition Council. The Competition Council itself is composed of a general 
assembly of councillors, a college of competition prosecutors and a registry.19 In 
practice, a member of the college of competition prosecutors instructs the members of 
the Competition Service to conduct inspections or assemble materials in order to 
compose a file that is to be brought before the Council’s general assembly.20 The 
general assembly will subsequently hear both the competition prosecutor and the 
parties subject to the investigation before rendering an administrative judgment.21 
Appeals against the Council’s decision are organised before the Brussels Court of 
Appeal.22 An appellate procedure can only be initiated by the parties involved in the 
decision or by the Federal Minister of Economic Affairs.23 The Minister can also 
intervene in appellate proceedings initiated by the parties involved. Since the college of 
competition prosecutors comprises an inherent part of the judicial Council, it does not 
qualify as a party involved and could not possibly initiate or intervene in appellate 
proceedings.24 If the Competition Council – even if represented by the college of 
competition prosecutors – were to intervene or appear in appellate proceedings, a first 
instance court would become a party to a dispute in which it already acted as a judge. 
Such a situation would run counter to the principle of unbiased decision-making (nemo 
iudex in sua causa).25 
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50613. 
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Justice dans l’affaire VEBIC: une opportunité de parfaire l’organisation de l’autorité belge de concurrence’, 
(2011) 1 Tijdschrift voor Belgische Mededinging – Revue de la Concurrence Belge 14; F. Rizzuto, ‘The 
procedural implications of VEBIC’, (2011) 32(6) European Competition Law Review 287. 
25  Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi in Case C-439/08, Vebic, para 61 and para 80-82. 
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This Belgian procedure resulted in a quirky institutional outcome in the Vebic case. 
Vebic, a Belgian bakery federation found itself the sole party in appellate proceedings 
against a Competition Council decision imposing a fine on it.26 As the Minister had 
chosen not to intervene, no governmental representative acted as a defendant in the 
appellate procedure, leaving Vebic as the sole party to the appellate dispute. Although 
Vebic did not object to that situation, the Court of Appeal questioned the compatibility 
of the national regime with the requirements of EU law.27 
In its December 2010 judgment, the Court of Justice held that this organisational 
system violated EU law. The Court reasoned that ‘[a]lthough Article 35(1) of the 
Regulation leaves it to the domestic legal order of each Member State to determine the 
detailed procedural rules for legal proceedings brought against decisions of the 
competition authorities designated thereunder, such rules must not jeopardise the 
attainment of the objective of the regulation, which is to ensure that Articles 101 TFEU 
and 102 TFEU are applied effectively by those authorities’.28 In cases where a national 
competition authority would not be afforded rights as a party to proceedings, a risk 
remains that the court before which the proceedings have been brought might be 
wholly captive to the pleas in law and arguments put forward by the undertaking(s) 
bringing the proceedings.29 Article 35 Regulation 1/2003 should therefore be read to 
preclude national rules which do not allow a national competition authority to 
participate, as a defendant or respondent, in judicial proceedings brought against a 
decision that the authority itself has taken.30 
At the same time, the Court did not posit an absolute intervention obligation for 
national authorities. National competition authorities were to gauge the extent to which 
their intervention is truly necessary in a particular case. Should the authority 
systematically refuse to appear in appellate proceedings, the effectiveness of EU law 
would be brought in jeopardy.31 The Court subsequently left it to the Member States to 
designate the body or bodies of the national competition authority which may 
participate, as a defendant or respondent, in proceedings brought before a national 
court against a decision which the authority itself has taken, while at the same time 
ensuring that fundamental rights are observed and that European Union competition 
law is fully effective.32 
The Court’s approach in Vebic is twofold. On the one hand, the Court directly 
mandates institutional overhaul of the Belgian competition law supervision system by 
                                                                                                                                         
26  C-439/08, Vebic, para 37. 
27  C-439/08, Vebic, para 39. 
28  C-439/08, Vebic, para 57. 
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infringements of the competition rules and imposing fines, which involves complex legal and economic 
assessments, the very existence of such a risk is likely to compromise the exercise of the specific obligation 
on national competition authorities under the Regulation to ensure the effective application of Articles 101 
TFEU and 102 TFEU’. 
30  C-439/08, Vebic, para 59. 
31  C-439/08, Vebic, para 60. 
32  C-439/08, Vebic, para 61. 
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requiring it to enable the Competition Council to intervene in appellate proceedings. 
Although the Court of Justice referred to Article 35 Regulation 1/2003 as the legal 
basis for its judgment, that provision merely obliges Member States to designate 
authorities and courts competent to apply EU competition law and enables them to 
allocate different powers and functions to national authorities and courts. The Court 
nevertheless read into Article 35 a mandate to organise the institutional operations of 
national competition authorities in compliance with the observance of fundamental 
rights.33 More spectacularly even, the Court specifically required that an appellate 
procedure against a national competition authority’s decision should always (potentially) 
allow for the participation of national competition authorities, even to the extent that a 
national authority is a court itself. This implies that national law limitations on a 
national authority’s participation should be discarded and replaced with a more fitting 
institutional alternative reflective of the Court’s ideal-typical image of competition law 
enforcement.34  
On the other, the Court immediately limited the intervention of national competition 
authorities in appellate proceedings by allowing a national authority to gauge the 
necessity of an intervention and by merely prohibiting it from systematically refusing to 
appear as a defendant or respondent in those proceedings. At the same time, the Court 
did not directly address the scope of appellate review, nor did it mandate unlimited 
jurisdiction to be an EU standard of national appellate review.35 In doing so, the Court 
seemed to retract from its bold statement that participative review is necessary in all 
instances as a matter of EU law. That retraction did not however save national 
institutional arrangements like the Belgian system, which did not at all accommodate 
participative judicial review as envisaged by the Court. The bottom-line of the 
judgment, i.e. the participation requested from national authorities in appellate 
procedures against their own decisions, has indeed firmly been posited. 
2.2. Understanding Vebic: institutional assimilation through participative 
judicial review and functional segregation 
The Vebic judgment reflects a shift in the understanding of convergence identified in 
the wake of Regulation 1/2003. Despite reservations the Court makes in that judgment 
as to the extent of a national authority’s participation in appellate procedures, it posits a 
national competition authority’s participation in appellate review procedures as an 
institutional principle of EU competition law. In doing so, the Court of Justice takes 
convergence among national legal systems in the wake of Regulation 1/2003 to a new 
level. It presents itself as a supranational standard-setter determining the institutional 
organisation of national competition appellate procedures. More specifically, it imposes 
a particular institutional blueprint of a procedurally viable system on the Belgian, and by 
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34  See F. Rizzuto, note 24, 286. 
35  The Court only refers to this as a matter of fact, see C-439/08, Vebic, para 44. 
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extension all national,36 legal order(s).37 Rather than enabling spontaneous convergence 
among diverging national regimes, the Court directly mandates national legal orders to 
assimilate around principles of institutional organisation it determines necessary for the 
effective enforcement of EU competition law in a national setting. As a result, the 
Court provides national legal orders with ‘institutional guidance’ on how to implement 
and comply with an EU-proof system of decentralised competition law enforcement. 
The scope of institutional guidance reflected in Vebic appears only to include the 
obligation for national authorities to participate in appellate proceedings against their 
own decisions. However, that obligation additionally and more fundamentally 
presupposes a particular institutional framework enabling such participation. Although 
the Court of Justice does not provide particular guidance on the best approach in that 
regard, its concrete application in the institutional realm of Belgian competition law 
hints at a preference for functionally segregated competition authorities at the national 
level. The Belgian competition council comprises an independent administrative court. 
The college of competition prosecutors, although now formally a part of the 
Competition Council administrative court structure, used to be an independent 
prosecuting department before its integration into the Council.38 By integrating the 
college into the administrative court structure, it became an essential part of the 
Competition Council – a court – and was therefore unable to intervene in the appellate 
proceedings.39 The equation between the college of competition prosecutors and the 
decision-making general assembly of the Competition Council in that respect 
nevertheless appears overrated. The college of competition prosecutors de facto remains 
independent from the general assembly. It brings the case to the assembly, makes its 
case to which the defendant undertakings respond before the assembly goes into recess 
to adopt a decision.40 The competition prosecutor is not involved in that decision-
making stage and will have to accept the outcome of that decision. The prosecution and 
decision-making departments of the Competition Council are therefore functionally 
segregated parts of a single institutional whole. 
Vebic could therefore be read as requiring this segregation to be sanctioned by EU law. 
In his opinion to the Vebic judgment, the Advocate General indeed referred to 
functional segregation as a potential solution for the obligation imposed on the national 
court to allow ‘competition authority’ participation at the appellate stage. He argued 
                                                                                                                                         
36  On the impact of the judgment on other legal orders, see N. Petit, ‘The Judgment of the European Court of 
Justice in VEBIC: Filling a Gap in Regulation 1/2003’, (2011) 2(4) Journal of European Competition Law & 
Practice 343 and F. Rizzuto, note 24, 286. 
37  In so doing, the Court acts as a catalyst in promoting new governance mechanisms at the national levels. For 
more examples of the judicial role in that regard, see J. Scott and S. Sturm, ‘Courts as Catalysts: Re-thinking 
the judicial role in new governance’, (2007) 13 Columbia Journal of European Law 565-594. 
38  See also F. Rizzuto, ‘Competition Law Enforcement in Belgium: The System Remains Flawed and Uncertain 
Despite Recent Reform’, (2008) 29(6) European Competition Law Review 367-375. 
39  That structure could be referred to as an integrated agency model, the ‘agency’ in this case being a national 
administrative court structure. See M. Trebilcock and E. Iacobucci, ‘Designing Competition Law 
Institutions: Values, Structure, and Mandate’, (2010) 41 Loyola University of Chicago Law Journal 459-464 
for a classification attempt of public enforcement structures. 
40  Article 45 LPEC. 
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that as a matter of EU law, the participation of the prosecuting part of the competition 
authority would not be per se incompatible with the Belgian institutional framework.41 
A similar solution could also be read into Article 35(4) Regulation 1/2003, which states 
that when a national authority brings an action before a judicial authority that is 
separate and different from the prosecuting authority, the effects of the Commission 
withdrawing a case on the basis of Article 11(6) shall be limited to the authority 
prosecuting the case which shall withdraw its claim before the judicial authority. 
Although Regulation 1/2003 does not as such mandate a functional segregation 
between prosecution and decision-making stages whenever a national regime opts for a 
judicial authority adopting competition law infringement decisions, it most definitely 
envisages such segregation. That obligation would be justified by demands for 
compliance with the fundamental procedural rights supporting the application of EU 
competition law.42 The organisational principle of segregated prosecution and decision-
making functions in competition law procedures could thus be said to be reflected in 
the ‘system’ of Regulation 1/2003, which mandates its institutionalisation at the 
national level. As a result, national competition authorities preferentially have to 
operate as bifurcated enforcement structures.43 
The Court subsequently extended the obligatory effects of functional segregation into 
the appellate review stage and confirmed the adversarial nature of appellate review 
procedures. The judgment could be read as presenting a two-stage argument in that 
respect. First, the system of decentralised competition law enforcement envisages 
national authorities to be either competent directly to adopt infringement decisions or 
to bring these decisions before a (specific) national court. Member States remain free to 
opt for one of these institutional solutions. Second, to the extent that the prosecuting 
and judicial authority constitute a single institutional whole – as the Belgian case 
demonstrates – the functional independence of both parts of that entity should be 
recognised, in order to allow the administrative-prosecuting part of the entity to 
intervene in appellate proceedings and to defend the national authority’s decision. In 
order for participative judicial review to be rendered meaningful, the authority involved 
in ‘prosecuting’ the case should also be able to participate in appellate proceedings 
against the final decision adopted by the judicial part of the authority. The prosecuting 
part of the authority is not obliged to defend its own position adopted prior to a 
judicial decision or to initiate an appeal against a judicial decision that did not follow is 
position. As a matter of EU law, it only has to be granted standing to defend the public 
interest in appellate review proceedings initiated by undertakings against the national 
authority’s judicial decision. 
                                                                                                                                         
41  Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi in C-439/08, Vebic, para 100. 
42  C-439/08, Vebic, para 63. 
43  These bifurcated enforcement structures could either be administrative agencies or courts, see M. Trebilcock 
and E. Iacobucci, note 39, 461-462. See also Chapter IX of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) Model Law on Competition (2010), which distinguishes between bifurcated 
agency and bifurcated judicial models in addition to integrated agency structures such as the European 
Commission, see document TD/B/C.I/CLP/L.2 of 9 May 2011, available at 
http://unctad.org/en/docs/ciclpL2_en.pdf (last consulted 27 November 2012). 
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The effects of the Vebic judgment on national legal orders are both direct and futile. 
First, Vebic directly requires national legal systems to reflect a distinction between 
prosecution and decision-making functions to the extent that a single authority is not 
capable of intervening in appellate review procedures. Second, the distinction imposed 
nevertheless remains futile, as it should not necessarily materialise into two completely 
distinct enforcement bodies. Within the confines of the organisational principles of 
participative review and functional segregation, Member States remain free to 
determine the institutional organisation of their national competition authorities 
responsible for the application of EU law. National authorities can therefore continue 
to rely on an integrated administrative agency44 to prosecute and adopt competition law 
infringement decisions. The prosecuting part of the authority should nevertheless be 
able to appear as a defendant or respondent in appellate review proceedings.  
3. ASSIMILATION AS A FRAMEWORK OF UNDERSTANDING: FROM ‘DUE PROCESS’ 
TO ADVERSARIALISM 
The Court of Justice did not recognise the requirements of participative judicial review 
and functional segregation in complete isolation from the existing EU competition law 
enforcement regime and from the operations of the European Commission as a 
competition enforcement agency. The projection of a functional segregation preference 
in the Vebic judgment has indeed also been consistently manifested in the European 
Commission’s initiatives to make its procedure compatible with the demands of 
fundamental procedural rights or due process requirements. This section outlines that 
classical ‘due process’ narrative as a basis for institutional assimilation and the ways in 
which the Vebic judgment invites refinement of that narrative. It will be argued that the 
Court’s assimilation powers should not be studied in isolation from these European 
Commission initiatives. A functional segregation preference at the supranational level 
equally provides a basis for understanding judicially imposed adaptations on national 
competition law enforcement structures. 
3.1. The classical narrative: institutionalising ‘due process’ 
The pervasive but frustratingly vague requirements that adherence to the ‘rule of law’45 
imposes on those acting within its purview resulted in the identification of 
(fundamental) ‘procedural rights’ capable of ensuring a fair administrative decision-
making process.46 Procedural rights not only matter in national law, but have also 
become the hallmark of supranational administrative governance.47 In the EU context, 
                                                                                                                                         
44  M. Trebilcock and E. Iacobucci, note 39, 463-464. 
45  Article 2 TEU states that the Union is founded on the value of rule of law. Article 19(1) TEU additionally 
holds that the Court of Justice ensures that the law will be applied. Both provisions reflect a long-standing 
constitutional taste for judicial review and procedural rights, see K. Lenaerts, ‘The Rule of Law and the 
Coherence of the Judicial System of the European Union, (2007) 44(6) Common Market Law Review 1625-
1659; K. Lenaerts, ‘Federalism and the Rule of Law: Perspectives from the European Court of Justice’, 
(2010) 33 Fordham International Law Journal 1338-1387. 
46  See on that matter in general, T. Bingham, The Rule of Law, London, Penguin, 2011, 90-109. 
47  On procedural rights in an EU context, see P. Craig, EU Administrative Law, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2012, 320-355; C. Harlow, ‘European Administrative Law and the Global Challenge’, European 
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the importance of fundamental procedural rights has long been recognised by the 
Court of Justice, especially in situations where ‘sanctions’ could be imposed on 
individuals or firms.48 EU institutions, most notably the European Commission, had to 
ensure that these individuals or firms were granted an opportunity to have to express 
their views on the matter.49 The field of EU competition law was no exception in that 
regard. Newly established procedural rights subsequently promoted institutional 
adaptations at the Commission level. These adaptations gradually implemented a 
structural segregation between prosecutorial and decision-making functions. 
3.1.1. The first stage: finding procedural rights 
Some procedural safeguards have always accompanied the European Commission’s 
sanctioning competences in the realm of competition law. The right to be heard and 
the accompanying right of access to parts of the Commission’s file present the most 
notable example in that regard. Procedural Regulation 17/62 incorporated a right to be 
heard, which was later confirmed and refined in Regulation 99/63.50 The right to be 
heard was not however presented as a fundamental procedural entitlement. It rather 
included an opportunity for the undertaking concerned to respond in writing to the 
objections made by the European Commission.51 Regulation 99/63 framed the 
opportunity to respond in writing and orally as an important ‘right of defence’, but did 
not enable a regulative framework set to guarantee that right overall. According to that 
Regulation, a fine or periodic penalty could only be imposed on an undertaking if 
objections made against its practices or behaviour were made known to it52 and if the 
latter was granted an opportunity to respond to these objections. The opportunity to 
respond to these objections did not however bring along a full-fledged access to the 
Commission file, nor did it include an oral hearing per se.53 Quite to the contrary, an 
oral hearing specifically had to be requested for in the written comment responding to 
                                                                                                                                         
University Institute RSC Working Paper, No 98/23, 1998, http://www.eui.eu/DepartmentsAndCentres/ 
RobertSchumanCentre/Publications/WorkingPapers/9823 (last accessed May 12, 2012); on the importance 
of due process in a competition law context, see A. Riley, ‘Editorial. Developing Due Process in EC 
Competition Law’, (2005) 2(1) Competition Law Review 1-3. 
48  Case 17/74, Transocean Marine Paint v Commission, [1974] ECR 1063, para 15 and Case 85/76, Hoffmann La 
Roche v Commission, [1979] ECR 461, para 9. 
49  See for an instructive overview K. Lenaerts and J. Vanhamme, ‘Procedural Rights of Private Parties in the 
Community Administrative Process’, (1997) 34(3) Common Market Law Review 531-569. 
50  Council Regulation 17 implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, [1962] O.J. L 13/204 (English Special 
Edition, Chapter 1959-1962, 87); Regulation 99/63 of the Commission of 25 July 1963 on the hearings 
provided for in Article 19 (1) and (2) of Council Regulation No 17, [1963] O.J. L127/2268 (English Special 
Edition Series I Chapter 1963-1964, 47). Regulation 99/63 has later been replaced by Commission 
Regulation 2842/98 of 22 December 1998 on the hearing of parties in certain proceedings under Articles 85 
and 86 of the EC Treaty, [1998] O.J. L 354/18. 
51  See J. Joshua, ‘The Right to be Heard in EEC Competition Procedures’, (1991-1992) 15 Fordham 
International Law Journal 17. 
52  Article 2(3) Regulation 99/63. 
53  This only gradually changed, see M. Levitt, Access to the File: The Commission’s Administrative Procedures 
in Cases under Articles 85 and 86 EC’, (1997) 34(6) Common Market Law Review 1416; A. Andreangeli, EU 
Competition Enforcement and Human Rights, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2008, 63. 
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the objections54 and the hearing would be conducted in a non-public setting by the 
persons appointed to do so by the Commission.55 In reality, these persons were the 
Commission officials charged with the investigation.56 The decision-making body itself, 
the College of Commissioners, was not involved in the actual hearing. The College did 
not therefore have an opportunity to hear different sides of a case like a judge would in 
an adversarial trial context.57 
Focused attention to procedural rights only slowly and gradually emerged as a result of 
proclamations made by the European Court of Justice. In an important study on the 
emergence of European (procedural) rights, Francesca Bignami argued that the process 
of identifying and ‘constitutionalising’ these rights resulted from pressures imposed on 
the European Commission by the accession of the United Kingdom to the European 
Economic Community. It was feared that the UK’s insistence on principles of ‘natural 
justice’ operating in the administrative realm, as well as the judicial review of these 
principles before the English courts could have resulted in the refusal of English judges 
to honour or recognise Commission decisions that infringed these principles. As a 
result, the Court of Justice and the Commission were said to have no other choice but 
to enhance procedural rights.58 
The recognition of fundamental procedural rights did not immediately transform the 
institutional functioning of the European Commission. It should be remembered that 
the European Commission is basically a political body functioning in many ways like an 
executive agency with independent regulatory decision-making powers at the national 
level.59 Officials in the Directorate-General are responsible for the investigation and 
prosecution of a particular case. The actual decision-making is subsequently relegated to 
the politically accountable Commission Members, who adopt a collegiate and binding 
decision.60 Since the Commission is not a tribunal61, its administrative decision-making 
procedure groups elements of investigation, prosecution and judgment. 
                                                                                                                                         
54  Article 7(1) Regulation 99/63. 
55  Article 9(1) Regulation 99/63. 
56  A. Andreangeli, note 53, 47; M. Albers and J. Jourdan, ‘The Role of Hearing Officers in EU Competition 
Proceedings: a Historical and Practical Perspective’, (2011) 2(3) Journal of European Competition Law & 
Practice 186. 
57  J. Joshua, note 51, 63. 
58  F. Bignami, ‘Creating European Rights: National Values and Supranational Interests’, (2004) 11 Columbia 
Journal of European Law 258-292. See more generally R. D. Kelemen, Eurolegalism. The Transformation of Law 
and Regulation in the European Union, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2011, 52-56, framing the rise of 
procedural rights in a broader movement of legal adversarialism that is permeating the EU legal architecture. 
59  Literature on this matter is voluminous, see for more references, J. Joshua, note 51, 65; W. Wils, ‘The 
Combination of the Investigative and Prosecutorial Function and the Adjudicative Function in EC Antitrust 
Enforcement: A Legal and Economic Analysis’, (2004) 27(2) World Competition 201; see also I. Forrester, 
‘Due process in EC competition cases: a distinguished institution with flawed procedures’, (2009) 34(6) 
European Law Review 817-843. 
60  Article 17(6)(b) TEU, stating that the Commission acts as a collegiate body when adopting decisions. In 
competition law, an advisory committee of Member States authorities should be consulted before adopting a 
decision, see Article 14 Regulation 1/2003. 
61  J. Joshua and C. Harding, Regulating Cartels in Europe, 2nd Edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010, 
200-202. See already Joined Cases 56/64 and 58/64, Consten and Grundig, [1966] ECR 299 in which the Court 
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Over time however, the Commission procedure has been modified in response to these 
nationally-induced procedural rights challenges. The investigation and prosecution 
stages have become engrained with the need to ensure that complainants or whistle-
blowers obtain particular rights of access or rights to be informed.62 The Court of 
Justice also emphasised the importance of legal professional privilege and outlined a 
detailed and nuanced procedure for Commission decisions on how to proceed with 
potentially privileged information.63 A Commission Notice on Best Practices in 
Commission infringement procedures confirmed the importance of procedural rights in 
that regard.64 
3.1.2. The second stage: institutional adaptations towards adversarialism 
Recognition of procedural rights did not in itself trigger institutional adaptations. The 
nature of these procedural rights as fundamental rights did nevertheless serve as a basis 
for institutional modifications at the Commission level. The most poignant example of 
that evolution is the movement towards a more ‘adversarial’ procedure in which 
prosecuting bodies and investigated undertakings engage in an interlocutory process 
before an infringement decision is adopted. At the Commission level, the incremental 
increase in powers of the Hearing Officer provide an important example of the Union’s 
institutional preference for adversarialism. 
As a starting point, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) plays a particularly important background role in the 
movement towards adversarialism. Article 6 ECHR states that ‘[i]n the determination 
of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is 
entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law’. The EU is currently not a party to the ECHR,65 
                                                                                                                                         
stated that the Commission was not a tribunal. See also Case 218/78 P, van Landewyck SARL v Commission, 
[1980] ECR 3125, para 81; Cases 100-103/80, Musique de Diffusion Française v Commission, [1983] ECR 1825 
para 7; Joined Cases T-109/02, 118/02, 122/02, 125/02, 126/02, 128/02, 129/02, 132/02 and 136/02, 
Bollorè and others v Commission, [2007] ECR II- 947, para 86; Case T-54/03, Lafarge v Commission, [2008] ECR 
II-120, para 47. For more background, see N. Zingales, ‘The Hearing Officer in EU Competition Law 
Proceedings: Ensuring Full Respect for the Right to be Heard?’, (2010) 7(1) Competition Law Review 130. 
62  See J. Flattery, ‘Balancing Efficiency and Justice in EU Competition Law: Elements of Procedural Fairness 
and their Impact on the Right to a Fair Hearing’, (2010) 7(1) Competition Law Review 54-56. 
63  See Case 155/79, AM&S Europe Limited v Commission, [1982] ECR 1575, para 18 and Case C-550/07, Akzo 
Nobel Chemicals and Akcros Chemicals v Commission, judgment of 14 September 2010, nyr. See also A. 
Andreangeli, ‘The Protection of Legal Professional Privilege in EU Law and the Impact of the Rules on the 
Exchange of Information within the European Competition Network on the Secrecy of Communications 
between Lawyer and Client: one step forward, two steps back?’, (2005) 2(1) Competition Law Review 39. 
64  For the most recent version, see Commission notice on best practices in proceedings concerning articles 101 
and 102 TFEU, [2011] O.J. C 308/6. For an overview of current procedural rights, see D. Anderson and R. 
Cuff, ‘Cartels in the EU: Procedural Fairness for Defendants and Claimants’ in B. Hawk (ed.), International 
Antitrust Law & Policy. Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Competition Law Institute, Huntington, Juris, 2011, 197-
235. 
65  Although very concrete plans have recently materialised: Article 6 TEU mandates the European Union to 
accede to the ECHR and concrete steps have been taken in that regard, see T. Lock, EU accession to the 
ECHR: implications for the judicial review in Strasbourg’, (2010) 35(6) European Law Review 777-798; See 
also T. Lock, ‘Walking on a tightrope: the draft ECHR accession agreement and the autonomy of the EU 
legal order, (2011) 48(4) Common Market Law Review 1034. 
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but all its Member States are and their national (administrative) law regimes are shaped 
in compliance with ECHR interpretations. The European Court of Human Rights 
confirmed that national competition law fines could be captured by the ECHR’s 
reference to criminal charges and should therefore be subject to all guarantees included 
in Article 6 and the adversarial institutional framework it projects.66 As a result, 
competition law fines should be imposed by an independent and impartial tribunal in 
the meaning of Article 6 ECHR following a hearing in which both prosecution and 
defendants argue their case before an impartial decision-maker. However, given the 
particularities of national administrative decision-procedures and for reasons of 
administrative efficiency, the ECtHR has long accepted that the involvement of an 
impartial tribunal should not always occur at the actual decision-making or fining stage 
in areas not covered by ‘hard core’ or ‘real’ criminal law provisions.67 These cases most 
notably involve administrative or disciplinary sanctions.68 In those instances, it suffices 
that judicial review is available following the decision taken by a non-adjudicative 
body.69 Ex post judicial review requires the reviewing court to have full jurisdiction to 
re-investigate the merits of the matter,70 i.e. jurisdiction to consider whether the 
authority correctly classified the facts it opted to rely on, whether it did not transgress 
the margins of its discretion and whether it applied the law correctly.71 Only in those 
cases would a national administrative law regime – such as a national competition 
authority able to impose fines – be compatible with the fundamental right to a fair trial. 
The ECHR casts a shadow over the operations of the European Commission. 
Although it is commonly argued that the Commission’s administrative sanctioning 
procedure could remain in existence as long as judicial review was open to those 
affected by its decisions,72 the Commission responded to ECHR-induced national law 
                                                                                                                                         
66  ECtHR, A. Menarini Diagnotics S.R.L. v Italy, judgment of 27 September 2011, para 59. At the EU level, a 
similar proclamation has been made by Advocate General Sharpston in her Opinion to Case C-272/09 P, 
KME Germany v Commission, judgment of 7 December 2011, nyr, para 64. 
67  On the notion of hard core criminal sanctions, see ECtHR, Jussila v Finland, judgment of 23 November 2006, 
para 43. I. Forrester maintains that Commission fines are indeed hard core, see I. Forrester, ‘A challenge for 
Europe's judges: the review of fines in competition cases’, (2011) 36(2) European Law Review 202. Wils on 
the contrary argues the contrary in W. Wils, ‘The Increased Level of Antitrust Fines, Judicial Review and the 
ECHR’, (2010) 33(1) World Competition 5-29. Advocate General Sharpston accepts Wils’ position in her 
Opinion to C-272/09 P, KME Germany v Commission, judgment of 7 December 2011, nyr, para 67. For 
alternative proposals in that regard, see J. Killick and P. Berghe, ‘This is not the time to be tinkering with 
Regulation 1/2003 – It is time for fundamental reform – Europe should have change we can believe in’, 
(2010) 6(2) Competition Law Review 259-285. 
68  See in the realm of non-criminal disciplinary sanctions, ECtHR, Albert and Le Compte v Belgium, judgment of 
10 February 1983, para 29; in the realm of criminal sanctions, ECtHR, Öztürk v Germany, judgment of 21 
February 1984, para 56. 
69  See D. Slater, S. Thomas and D. Waelbroeck, ‘Competition Law Proceedings before the European 
Commission and the Right to a Fair Trial: No Need for Reform?’, (2009) 5(1) European Competition 
Journal 125-126 for an overview in that regard. 
70  ECtHR, Albert and Le Compte v Belgium, para 29. 
71  ECtHR, Menarini, para 159. 
72  Speech by A. Italianer, Director-General of the Directorate-General for Competition at the OECD 
Competition Committee Meeting, Paris, 18 October 2011, 3, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/ 
text/sp2011_12_en.pdf. 
Institutional Assimilation in EU Competition Law  
  (2012) 8(3) CompLRev 298 
concerns to improve attention for procedural rights and to implement the adversarial 
requirements of Article 6 ECHR already during the administrative stage. The 
establishment of a Hearing Officer constitutes the most notable example in that 
regard.73 Following a critical 1982 House of Lords Report focusing on the monolithic 
decision-making structure of the Commission, the latter charged a specific Director in 
the Directorate-General for Competition with conducting the hearings. That director 
would serve as a more independent arbiter between the investigating and prosecuting 
officials and the investigated undertakings.74 The role of the Hearing Officer was 
explicitly recognised in a 1994 Commission decision.75 In 2001, the Hearing Officer 
was formally detached from the Directorate-General for Competition and transferred 
to an independent unit directly reporting to the Member of the Commission 
responsible for competition.76 In that capacity, an even more independent Hearing 
Officer was responsible to organise the hearing and thus to enable an independent 
internal check on DG Competition officials. The Hearing Officer reported on the 
status of the hearing and procedural rights discussions to the College of Commission 
Members, who would then be able to make an informed decision.77 
The October 2011 reform of the terms of reference of the Hearing Officer constituted 
the pinnacle of institutional translation of the right to be heard and more generally of 
an adversarial decision-making system in the EU competition law realm. Decision 
2011/695/EU upgraded the Hearing Officer’s mandate and extended his competences 
deep into the investigation stage.78 From the perspective of Article 6 ECHR, the 
European Commission’s extension of the Hearing Officer’s mandate effectively 
translates its commitment to procedural rights into a particular institutional structure. 
The Hearing Officer enables a meaningful debate between the officials investigating a 
case and the undertakings subject to that investigation. Rather than just organising a 
hearing, the Hearing Officer guides and orbits the investigations from the outset until 
the ultimate decision and thus serves as a quasi-referee judge.79 Doing so enables him 
to provide a review mechanism exclusively focused on procedural rights. 
                                                                                                                                         
73  For an overview of the Hearing Officer’s historical role before the enactment of the 2011 adaptations, see 
M. Albers and J. Jourdan, note 56, 185-200; J. Flattery, note 62, 60-71; N. Zingales, note 61, 137-156. 
74  Twelfth Report on Competition Policy, 1983, para 36-37 and the (informal) mandate in annex at 273. 
75  Commission Decision 94/810/ECSC-EC of 12 December 1994 on the terms of reference of Hearing 
Officers in competition procedures before the Commission, [1994] O.J. L 330/67 
76  Article 2.2. of Commission Decision 2001/462/EC-ECSC of 23 May 2001 on the terms of reference of 
hearing officers in certain competition proceedings, [2001] O.J. L 162/21. 
77  Article 15 Decision 2001/462/EC-ECSC. 
78  Decision of the President of the European Commission of 13 October 2011 on the function and terms of 
reference of the Hearing Officer in certain competition proceedings, [2011] O.J. L 275/29. See W. Wils, 
‘The Role of the Hearing Officer in Competition Proceedings before the European Commission’, (2012) 
35(3) World Competition 431-456. 
79  This was not the case prior to the 2011 reforms, see L. Ortiz Blanco, EC competition procedure, Oxford, 
Clarendon, 1996, 199; on the 2011 reform, P. Van Cleynenbreugel, ‘The Hearing Officer’s extended 
mandate. Whose special friend in the conduct of EU competition proceedings?’, (2012) 36(6) European 
Competition Law Review 286-293. 
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Any meaningful procedural control mechanism in the hands of a quasi-independent 
Hearing Officer would seem useless unless a segregation of functions could be detected 
between the investigating body called upon to rely on procedural rights and a decision-
making body inferring consequences from the (dis)respect to these procedural rights. 
Although the Hearing Officer does not have particular competences to decide on 
substantive matters and merely draws up a report for the decision-making College of 
Commissioners, it effectively checks and balances the operations of DG Competition 
officials and aims to remedy any procedural defects before the case reaches the College 
of Commissioners. In so doing, the Hearing Officer provides a wedge between the 
political body adopting the actual decision and the Directorate-General Competition 
making a case and defending it with the Commission. Although that system does not 
provide a full-fledged separation of functions - these all constitute departments or parts 
of one EU institution, the Commission - a clear segregation can be detected between 
the investigation/prosecution stage in which particular procedural rights remain 
guaranteed by an impartial arbiter and a final decision-making stage building upon the 
















Hearing Officer reporting 
to European Commission 
decision-making College of Commissioners European Commission 
 
3.2. The ‘convergence’ stage: spontaneous procedural harmonisation and institutional 
assimilation 
Both the recognition of procedural rights and the institutional adaptations at the EU 
level are captured by a framework of understanding of responsive institutional 
translation. Responsive institutional translation argues80 that particular national legal 
regimes spurred the development of a body of procedural rights at the EU level in 
order for the latter to maintain operational legitimacy. As a result of that approach, 
particular institutional adaptations were coined in order to adapt to newfound 
supranational rights. The institutional responses developed in that regard present 
institutional transformation as a one-way bottom-up process triggered by Member State 
                                                                                                                                         
80  And as such aligns with a historical-institutionalist perspective, see I. Maher, ‘Competition Law 
Modernization: An Evolutionary Tale?’ in P. Craig and G. De Búrca, The Evolution of EU Law, 2nd. Edition, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, 722-723. For a similar perspective, see D. Gerber, ‘The 
Transformation of European Community Competition Law?’, (1994) 35(1) Harvard International Law 
Journal 97-148. 
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- EU interaction. That process eventually culminates into a supranational institutional 
regime reflective of national legal solutions that in itself projects a framework for 
convergence of national institutional solutions.81 At the convergence or re-translation 
stage, procedural rights and institutional adaptations nevertheless appear to part ways. 
The scope of convergence offered by a classical narrative focused on due process 
foresees a re-translation of procedural rights at the supranational level into national 
legal systems that did not adopt or spur these adaptations. As a result, the process of 
transplantation of particular elements or structures – in this case, emphasis on 
procedural rights as fundamental requirements of fair competition law supervision – is 
reported to generate a similar outlook among different national systems operating in 
the shadows of the supranational arrangements.82 The retranslation phase, i.e. the scope 
of convergence envisaged in the classical narrative should not however be 
overestimated. Convergence in and of itself implies a gradual alignment of national legal 
regimes. At the same time, these gradual alignment evolutions do not take place in a 
top-down mandated structure, but are rather triggered by a watch, learn and adopt 
model based on mutual learning and networking as underlying governance 
approaches.83 As a result, the mechanisms of convergence generated by responsive 
institutional translation present long term solutions and predictions about the actual 
scope of convergence remain highly uncertain. 
Moving beyond the mere recognition and translation of procedural rights, the Court’s 
judgment in Vebic proposes an important institutional reconsideration of that classical 
narrative. In directly identifying concrete mandatory principles of institutional 
organisation in national competition law enforcement, the underlying idea of national 
institutional autonomy84 governing the convergence debate shifts into a more 
heteronomous successor. That heteronomous posture allows the Court to mandate 
direct adaptations of national legal systems. National legal systems are no longer 
autonomous, but see their choices limited in the light of institutional principles 
identified by the Court of Justice. As a result, a shift from classical ‘inquisitorial’ 
administrative regimes to more adversarial conceptions can be identified.85 The 
principles of participative deliberative judicial review (administrative authority and 
undertaking appearing before a judge) and functional segregation of prosecution and 
decision-making functions (bifurcated enforcement structures) appear to be two 
alternative or cumulative choices to be taken into account in that regard. Any deviation 
from retaining policy room created by either principle in the organisation of national 
                                                                                                                                         
81  See R. Nazzini, note 3, 30; J. Flattery, note 62, 79-80. 
82  I. Maher, note 9, 233-234; M. Drahos, note 9, 387-418 referring to supranational pushes and national pulls. 
83  For the institutional framework enabling that development, see M. De Visser, Network-based Governance in EC 
Law. The example of EC Competition Law and EC Communications Law, Nijmegen, Wolf Legal Publishers, 2009, 
546 pp. 
84  See P. Girerd, ‘Les principes d’équivalence et d’effectivité: encadrement ou désencadrement de l’autonomie 
procédurale des Etats membres?’, (2002) 38 Revue Trimesterielle de Droit Européen 76 for an elaboration 
of that principle. 
85  M. Asimow an L. Dunlop, ‘The Many Faces of Administrative Adjudication in the European Union’, (2009) 
61 Administrative Law Review 141. 
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competition law enforcement structures would amount to potential intervention by the 
Court of Justice holding that organisation contrary to the system of Regulation 1/2003 
and the fundamental procedural rights underlying it, as also reflected in Article 6 
ECHR. 
From that perspective, institutional principles constitute a precondition for institutions 
reflecting due process concerns. Though related to ‘due process’ concerns, the 
institutional principle narrative should clearly be distinguished from a procedural rights 
alternative. The former actually demands the creation a new set of supranational 
institutional principles enabling due process at the EU and national levels rather than 
promoting gradual alignment of national laws. It could therefore aptly be termed 
responsive institutional assimilation. Assimilation implies a stronger connotation than 
‘convergence’ but does not reflect a singular institutional model of national and EU 
competition law enforcement. It still projects a gradual, albeit mandated, movement 
towards similar institutional structures grounded in adversarialism. 
3.3. Institutional assimilation in practice: institutionalising adversarialism 
The Court in Vebic mandates the establishment of assimilated institutional structures at 
the national level within the principled boundaries established at the EU level. These 
structures either include a functionally segregated administrative authority adopting 
administrative decisions it will defend before a national court or an administrative 
authority adopting a prosecution decision that will be brought before an administrative 
tribunal which will subsequently hear both the authority and the undertakings 
concerned. In both instances, the institutional structure of national competition 
institutions should reflect the particular taste for adversarialism both in the decision-
making and review stages. The major difference between both systems is that the latter 
posits a true separation of functions, whereas the former only requires these functions 
to be segregated. The following table graphically shows the institutional options 
available following the Vebic judgment. The institutional principles identified in Vebic 
allow concrete national and supranational institutional arrangements to vary along a 
multitude of options, as the table shows. In addition, they do not address the scope or 
intensity of review exercised by the national courts.86 It could therefore be expected 
that future institutional refinements may come from the Court willing further to narrow 
                                                                                                                                         
86  The intensity of judicial review differs significantly across jurisdictions. In the United Kingdom, the 
Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) adheres to a full jurisdiction standard against OFT decisions, see for an 
overview and application to the CAT, see D. Rose and T. Richards, ‘Appeal and Review in the Competition 
Appeal Tribunal and High Court’, www.blackstonechambers.com (last consulted 27 November 2012), 15. 
On the full jurisdiction scope of the CAT, see Schedule 8, Section 3(2) Competition Act 1998. See also S. 
Wilks, ‘Institutional Reform and the Enforcement of Competition Policy in the UK’, (2011) 7(1) European 
Competition Journal, 1-23. German courts on the other hand only apply a judicial review standard except for 
fines, see §71(4) and §83 of the Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen of 15 July 2005 (amended by 
Article 1 of the Act of 20 April 2009), Bundesgesetzblatt 2005 I, 2114 (hereinafter referred to as GWB). The 
European Court of Human Rights only warrants ‘full jurisdiction’ for ‘criminal sanctions’. See on the scope 
of criminal law guarantees in the ECHR, P. Mahoney, ‘Right to a Fair Trial in Criminal Matters under Article 
6 E.C.H.R.’, (2004) 4(2) Judicial Studies Institute Journal, 107-123.On the impact of Article 6 ECHR on the 
emergence of full jurisdiction in the review of fines, see T. Perroud, ‘The Impact of Article 6(1) ECHR on 
competition law enforcement: A comparison between France and the United Kingdom’, (2008) Global 
Antitrust Review, 56.  
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the institutional choices of national competition authorities in institutionalising a more 
adversarial procedural framework. 
The following table frames existing national and supranational competition law 
enforcement structures within the institutional organisation formats read into Vebic. It 
identifies the two institutional formats currently adhered to and a future design format 
promoted by the supranational ‘due process’ innovations outlined in the previous 
section. The ‘current choices’ column classifies existing national and supranational 
choices. The ‘institutional preference’ column reflects preferential organisational 
models of competition law supervision that are being considered at the national and 
supranational levels in the wake of Vebic. 
Institutional Format: 
bifurcated adversarialism 
Current Choices Institutional Preference 





Greece; the Netherlands; 
Poland; UK 
France? Belgium? 
separated or segregated 
prosecution and judicial 
decision-making 
UK (criminal), Ireland, 
Austria, Finland 
 
segregated prosecution and 
quasi-judicial88 decision-
making and prosecutorial 





The first institutional format comprises the majority model of national competition law 
structures operating in the realm of EU law: a functionally segregated single agency that 
participates in judicial review against its own decisions. The European Commission, 
Germany,89 Greece,90 Italy,91 the Netherlands,92 Poland93 and the United Kingdom 
                                                                                                                                         
87  The presence of judicial review mechanisms should be distinguished from the standards of intensity with 
which judges approach cases (judicial review v. full jurisdiction). It should be clear that Vebic does not 
directly address this issue. The ECtHR’s Menarini judgment, note 66, is important in that regard, see also M. 
Bronckers and A. Vallery, ‘Fair and effective competition policy in the EU: which role for Authorities and 
which role for the courts after Menarini?’, (2012) 8(2) European Competition Journal, 283-299. 
88  By quasi-judicial, I refer judge-like bodies that are not formally a part of a national legal systems civil, 
criminal or administrative judiciary. They can best be compared to US administrative law judges, who are 
specialised civil servants hearing claims before a classical judicial body will entertain the case, see M. Asimow 
an L. Dunlop, note 85, 142 and M. Trebilcock and E. Iacobucci, note 39, 463 refer to an integrated agency 
model in that respect. 
89  See §48 GWB. See also H. Schweitzer, ‘The European Competition Law Enforcement System and the 
Evolution of Judicial Review’ in C.D. Ehlermann and M. Marquis (ed.), European Competition Law Annual 
2009: The Evaluation of Evidence and its Judicial Review in Competition Cases, Oxford, Hart, 2011, 111. 
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(except for criminal law cartel procedures)94 are but a few examples of this framework. 
Although the national competition authority is designed as a single integrated authority, 
its functioning is segregated and oftentimes specialised chambers have been created 
within the authority to decide upon a case. These authorities do not function as courts, 
but serve as administrative authorities and adopt administrative decisions. Judicial 
review is typically conducted against the authority, which can defend itself in court. 
Following from Vebic, this adversarial appellate review stance is obligatory for each 
authority applying EU law. The French Autorité de la Concurrence is an administrative 
agency and operates in a functionally segregated way.95 According to French law 
however, the Autorité could not act as a defendant in appellate proceedings. It was 
upon the Minister of Economic Affairs to represent the ‘public interest’ as a defendant 
in appellate review cases.96 A few weeks after Vebic however, the Paris Court of Appeal 
has been willing – despite legislative provisions proclaiming the contrary – to recognise 
the administrative Autorité de la Concurrence as a sole defendant in appellate 
proceedings against its decisions.97 In so doing, it has made the French institutional 
framework more adversarial and Vebic-proof. 
A second institutional format presents a separated or segregated prosecution and 
decision-making body. In that ‘bifurcated’98 constellation, a prosecuting body adopts a 
preliminary position, which will subsequently be confirmed or adapted into a binding 
judicial or quasi-judicial decision. The Irish system99 and the UK’s criminal cartel 
procedure100 are cases in point in that regard. The Belgian system also reflects that 
approach. Appeals taken against these judicial decisions will typically include the 
                                                                                                                                         
90  See Case C-53/03, Syfait, [2005] ECR I-4609, para 29-37; para 33 states that in so far as there is an 
operational link between the Epitropi Antagonismou [the Greek Competition Authority], a decision-making 
body, and its secretariat, a fact-finding body on the basis of whose proposal it adopts decisions, the Epitropi 
Antagonismou is not a clearly distinct third party in relation to the State body which, by virtue of its role, 
may be akin to a party in the course of competition proceedings. At the same time however, the 
administrative nature of the body was not called into question. 
91  As apparent from ECtHR, Menarini, para 12. 
92  See Article 2(3) Wet van 22 mei 1997, houdende nieuwe regels omtrent de economische mededinging 
(Dutch Competition Act), available at www.wetten.overheid.nl, referring to the Dutch Competition 
Authority as an independent administrative organ. 
93  Case C-375/09, Tele 2 Polska, para 11-13. 
94  See Section 1 Enterprise Act 2002; see H. Schweitzer, note 89, 121 for more background. See also C. 
Graham, ‘The Enterprise Act 2002 and Competition Law’, (2004) 67(2) Modern Law Review 273-288. 
95  Article L 461-1 French Commercial Code, available at www.legifrance.gouv.fr. 
96  Article R 464-11 French Commercial Code. 
97  See Paris Cour d’Appel, SCP Fisselier Chiloux Boulay, judgment of 27 January 2011, available at 
http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/user/standard.php?id_rub=138 (last consulted 27 November 2012); 
see also N. Petit, note 36, 344. 
98  M. Trebilcock and E. Iacobucci, note 39, 461; N. Petit, note 36, 343; F. Rizzuto, note 24, 286. 
99  See Sections 4 and 5 Irish Competition Act 2002, the infringement of which constitute criminal offences that 
will be brought by the Competition Authority before the District Court or the Central Criminal Court. F. 
Rizzuto, note 24, 286 also refers to Austria and Finland as examples of this model of enforcement, without 
direct reference to the criminal law nature of competition law in these systems. The Belgian model predating 
the 2006 legislative reform was captured by this format as well. 
100  See Section 190 2002 Enterprise Act. See also J. Joshua and C. Harding, note 61, 347. 
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prosecuting (part of the) authority and the undertakings concerned, yet this should not 
be the case. In accordance with the Vebic principles, it would suffice if the either the 
prosecution or the decision-making authority would be able to participate in appellate 
proceedings. Following Vebic, the simplest adaptation for Belgian law is to recognise 
the prosecuting part of the Competition Council’s role in appellate proceedings. 
Although the Council would formally take part in the appellate proceedings, the 
prosecuting part would be responsible. A system of Chinese walls between the 
prosecution and decision-making bodies currently in place in the internal operations of 
the Council would as a result be extended to the external appellate action stages. A 
recent Belgian proposal nevertheless envisions the establishment of a new 
administrative competition authority in accordance with the first institutional format.101 
A third institutional format combines the previous two and could be said to underlie 
both Vebic and the recent Commission procedural reforms. That format follows the 
Vebic reasoning to its fullest and would require the scope of adversarial judicial review 
to be institutionalised as prosecutorial participative judicial review. Prosecutorial review 
implies that the adversarial scope of judicial review should always take place between a 
prosecuting body and the undertakings concerned. If that conclusion is taken to its 
fullest extent, the organisation of national competition authorities should seriously be 
reorganised to strictly separate prosecution and decision-making bodies. Only the 
former bodies would then be able to participate in appellate proceedings, whereas the 
latter would serve as quasi-judges who could not intervene in appeals against their own 
decisions. Although no conclusive evidence for that evolution can be found in the 
Court’s case law itself, the continuing wedge between the prosecution and decision-
making stages at the Commission level, coupled with the imposition of national 
institutional segregation in Vebic at the very least hint at such a future approach. This is 
all the more confirmed at the Commission level. The Commission Legal Service, 
another segregated unit within the Commission, will not only represent the latter before 
the Courts, adopting its position on the case file assembled by the prosecuting director 
and on the basis of the decision adopted by the Commission,102 but will also 
continuously be involved in the prosecution and preparatory stages of decision-
making.103 The Legal Service is therefore uniquely positioned to defend the position 
adopted by the Commission as such, but also reflective of the prosecutorial points of 
view adopted. A system of prosecutorial participative judicial review would precisely 
imply this: a prosecutorial body that also defends the position of the authority’s final 
decision before the review court. In that constellation, the prosecutorial body only 
defends its own case file before the decision-making authority, but would be called 
                                                                                                                                         
101  See Article IV.16 Projet de Loi of 27 December 2012 portant insertion du Livre IV “Protection de la 
concurrence” et du Livre V “La concurrence et les évolutions de prix” dans le Code de droit économique et 
portant insertion des définitions propres au livre IV et au livre V et des dispositions d’application de la loi 
propres au livre IV et au livre V, dans les livres I et XV du Code de droit économique, available at 
http://www.dekamer.be/FLWB/PDF/53/2592/53K2592001.pdf (last consulted 5 March 2013). 
102  At this stage however, the Legal Service only expresses opinions that do not bind the Commission. As such, 
they cannot be invoked as evidence of the Commission adhering to a specific position when that position is 
not reflected in the final decision, see Case C-445/00, Austria v Council, [2003] ECR I-8549, para 28. 
103  M. Asimow an L. Dunlop, note 85, 157-158. See also W. Wils, note 59, 203. 
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upon to defend that authority’s take on appeals lodged by disgruntled investigated 
undertakings. Segregation between the prosecutorial and adjudicative ‘departments’ 
would in that understanding not only be necessary to ensure EU-compatible first 
instance decision-making, but also to enable meaningful appellate review systems. This 
setting differs from the first institutional format. In that format, no formal distinction is 
made between the prosecutorial and adjudicative parts of the authority for the purposes 
of appellate review. The aggrieved undertaking will face the agency that adopted an 
infringement decision as its interlocutor before an appellate review body. 
Since Vebic did not explicitly recognise a right to initiate appeals for a prosecutorial 
body, it would appear that a preference for a passive prosecutorial participative 
appellate review underlies the judgment. The Court did not however make explicit 
whether a system of passive prosecutorial appellate review underlying the third format 
should always be preferred over the first institutional format as a matter of EU law.104 
In that understanding, national authorities operating in accordance with the first format 
would be mandated to segregate prosecutorial and decision-making functions not only 
in relation to agency decision-making procedures, but also in the realm of appellate 
review against these decisions. As a result, the responsible prosecuting officer (e.g. the 
Senior Responsible Officer within the OFT)105 would not only be called upon to 
prosecute cases prior to the adoption of infringement decisions, but would also be 
obliged to defend the authority’s position in appellate cases (e.g. before the CAT) as a 
matter of EU law. The imposition of this third format on national authorities would 
therefore seriously curtail their national institutional autonomy. It remains questionable 
whether the Court would really prefer this format to emerge across the Member States. 
4. INSTITUTIONAL ASSIMILATION AS JUDICIALLY-INDUCED ENGINEERED 
‘ARCHITECTURE’: TAILORING LEGITIMATE COMPETITION LAW 
ENFORCEMENT? 
The approach adopted by the Court of Justice in developing assimilation principles to 
the image of supranational institutional evolutions directly challenges traditional 
understandings of legitimate competition law enforcement. Since the Court of Justice 
considers itself capable directly to intervene in the institutional organisation of national 
competition law enforcement structures, it could be argued that the acceptance of such 
intervention powers reflects a reconsideration of traditional proxies of legitimate 
competition law enforcement. This section investigates these proxies and the ways in 
which they require adaptation in the light of the Court’s new assimilation framework. 
                                                                                                                                         
104  This also means that active prosecutorial participative review should not per se be excluded at the national 
level as a matter of EU law. 
105  The Senior Responsible Officer would in that image be supported by the General Counsel’s staff. On the 
system of OFT decision-making and on the responsibilities of a Senior Responsible Officer, see OFT 
Guidance, ‘A guide to the OFT’s investigation procedures in competition cases’, October 2012, available at 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/policy/OFT1263rev (last consulted 27 November 2012). The OFT also 
inaugurated a Procedural Adjudicator to the image of the Commission’s Hearing Officer. This might indicate 
that the movement towards convergence is more directly affecting the institutional realm of EU competition 
law enforcement. Future judicial proclamations in that regard could transform these convergence modes into 
necessary principles of adequate national institutional organisation mandated by EU law. 
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Starting from adapted legitimacy proxies, this section outlines a basic ‘constitutional’ 
approach the Court could follow in order fully to incorporate the adapted proxies in its 
future case law. 
4.1. Efficiency and justice: classical proxies of legitimate competition law 
enforcement 
The judicial ‘institutionalisation’ of the assimilation principles identified in the previous 
sections first and foremost reflects a richer understanding of legitimacy in competition 
law enforcement. Discussions on what legitimate competition law enforcement entails 
largely focus on balancing efficiency and justice.106 In order to maintain an operational 
and effective competition law regime, both elements should be present. Principles 
governing the institutional architecture of an enforcement system only concern a 
secondary issue in that regard. 
The notion of efficiency refers to the emergence or maintenance of a system that most 
effectively contributes to the realisation of substantive (economic or political) goals. It 
is well-known that over time, these goals have shifted in EU competition law from 
market integration107 and competitor protection108 towards consumer protection 
translated into a specific combination of market integration and consumer welfare.109 
Increased attention to ‘consumer welfare’ equally underlies the ‘more economic 
approach’ in EU competition law discourse.110 From an efficiency perspective, EU 
competition law enforcement would be legitimate once concrete national and EU 
decisions support the idea of consumer welfare and incorporate that idea in the 
application of legal rules and principles. The legitimacy of competition law enforcement 
as a result depends on the substantive output of competition law enforcement agencies. 
It has long been accepted that mere efficiency output cannot alone justify an 
enforcement system that is capable of imposing particularly severe sanctions on 
individuals.111 These individuals also demand a ‘just’ environment in which their claims 
on whether or not practices threaten substantive goals, could be heard and discussed. 
As a result, the output of a legitimate enforcement system requires a complementary 
input set of ‘justice’ or ‘due process’ standards.112 As section three of this contribution 
                                                                                                                                         
106  W. Wils, Efficiency and Justice in European Antitrust Enforcement, Oxford, Hart, 2008, v; See also J. Flattery, note 
62, 53; M. Trebilcock and E. Iacobucci, note 39, 458. 
107  See R. D. Kelemen, note 58, 153; D. Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe. Protecting 
Prometheus, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998, 343. 
108  J. Joshua and C. Harding, note 61, 117-118 pinpoint the early competitor protection dynamic in the earliest 
cartel decisions. 
109  See P. Akman, ‘Consumer Welfare and Article 82 EC: Practice and Rhetoric’, (2009) 32(1) World 
Competition 71-90. 
110  G. Monti, ‘Article 81 EC and Public Policy’, (2002) 39(5) Common Market Law Review 1057-1099. 
111  On the need for a more justice-oriented public enforcement scheme as a corollary to ever increasing 
sanctioning practices, see R. Nazzini, note 3, 6. 
112  The distinction between output as efficiency and input as justice is not entirely aligned to recent legitimacy 
studies that distinguish input, process and output within a wide variety of legitimacy discourses, see C. Lord 
and P. Magnette, ‘E Pluribus Unum? Creative Disagreement about Legitimacy in the EU’, (2004) 32(1) Journal 
of Common Market Studies 183-202; the three-layered legitimacy framework even entered the realm of 
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demonstrated, the demand for justice standards in EU competition law resulted in the 
recognition of supranational procedural rights and the crystallisation of these rights into 
a particular institutional framework that in itself provided an example for national 
enforcement systems. Due process thus constituted an antidote for potential negative 
externalities reflected in a purely efficiency oriented system of enforcement. 
Competition law enforcement, it was argued, could only be legitimate to the extent that 
justice standards complemented the very ideas shaping efficiency. 
Attention to balancing efficiency and justice also presented a framework of 
understanding for the institutional adaptations summarised above. As a general 
perception, institutional transformations are mainly resulting from a different balance 
between efficiency and justice struck at a particular time in a particular policy context. 
In this classical perception, the institutional architecture of competition law 
enforcement is not considered an independent proxy of legitimate competition law 
enforcement. It provides a mere facilitating mechanism in order to guarantee a 
legitimately balanced input/output structure, but no direct proxy to assess the 
legitimacy of a particular competition law framework. 
4.2. Challenging the status-quo: engineered institutional architecture as an 
independent proxy of legitimate competition enforcement 
Institutional architecture is nevertheless essential in its own right to legitimate a 
particular legal framework. Architecture is a kind of law: it determines what people can 
and cannot do.113 The architectural design of a legal system is a tool to ensure the 
structural integrity of law as an operating system.114 It provides the primary assessment 
structure to determine that integrity. According to Colin Scott, design choices comprise 
important and non-notorious elements of control. In designing particular technological 
features (e.g. requiring an access code or key to enter a particular premise or file), a self-
executing regime imposing an absolute constraint is imposed on those subject to its 
rules.115 By directly controlling the operations as a matter of design, those regulated are 
faced with no other choice but to comply with the system’s design. As a result, the 
designed system itself becomes the bearer of a legitimate structure since other 
structures have been excluded from it. 
Although design arguments have mainly been relied on as justification markers for 
direct operating systems in technology116, they can also be transposed into law and legal 
                                                                                                                                         
judicial decision-making, as it supported Advocate General Sharpston’s Opinion in Joined Cases C-128/09, 
C-129/09, C-130/09, C-131/09, C-134/09 and C-135/09, Boxus and Others, nyr, judgment of 18 October 
2011, para 84. For the purposes of this contribution, the notion of process forms part of the concept of 
input, complementing the necessity of effective competition law enforcement (output). 
113  L. Lessig, Code and other laws of Cyberspace, New York, Basic Books, 1999, 59. 
114  D. Crane, The Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement, Oxford, Oxford University Press 2011, xiii. 
115  C. Scott, ‘The Governance of the European Union: The Potential for Multi-Level Control’, (2002) 8(1) 
European Law Journal 65. 
116  Scott refers to a system of designing cars so that a car would be immobilised when weight is detected but no 
seatbelt applies, see C. Scott, note 115, 66. For a general argument, see L. Lessig, note 113, 6 referring to a 
constitutional framework as a building process. 
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design itself. A legal system can theoretically foreclose the application of alternative 
legal positions and – at the same time – could also structure or enhance the legitimacy 
of existing operations by designing institutions that best match the substantive values 
the system inhabits.117 As a result of that position, the legitimacy of an institutional 
system could be framed in terms of its operational functioning as a means to enable 
particular substantive values.118 Values and institutional arrangements operate along a 
moving continuum, requiring institutional arrangements to provide for a legitimate 
enforcement context of substantive values and vice versa. From that perspective, it 
could be argued that in order to legitimate particular values such as efficiency and 
justice as enforcement tools, the institutional setup is important in itself. The 
institutional framework and its operations therefore function as an instrument to 
establish a legitimate substantive legal framework.119 In so doing, institutional 
architecture also functions as an independent marker of legitimacy. 
The Vebic judgment directly considers and evaluates the institutional architecture of 
national competition law enforcement structures. It also confirms the essential 
‘engineering’ role that is reflected into institutional architecture as an additional tool to 
ensure legitimacy. By identifying particular principles of institutional organisation, the 
Court is able to require national and supranational innovations to adhere to a set of 
principles that in themselves promote justice and enable an efficient competition law 
enforcement regime. Principles of institutional organisation are not however merely 
static elements reflecting the current balance of efficiency and justice considerations. As 
flexible and judicially refined standards of good institutional practice, they allow for the 
institutional architectural framework to be engineered towards desirable policy goals 
just like efficiency and justice concerns do. In order to be perceived legitimate, 
particular principles of institutional organisation have been engineered into the 
architectural system. Following Vebic, these principles include participative judicial 
review and functional segregation. 
From that perspective, competition law enforcement should no longer be assessed 
solely from the vantage points of efficiency and justice, it should also reflect an inherent 
set of engineering principles that shape and reshape the institutional architecture as an 
end in itself. Engineered institutional architecture thus complements both output and 
input and becomes a self-standing value framework in order to justify and legitimise 
particular choices made in the realm of competition law enforcement. The following 
graph appears in that respect. 
It is clear from the figure that engineering is still considered to contribute to both 
efficiency and justice. At the same time, engineering in itself presents a dynamic process 
that facilitates the interaction between efficiency and justice. It joins both aims around a 
                                                                                                                                         
117  C. Scott, note 115, 65. 
118  D. Crane, note 114, xiii. For a more general institutional design perspective, see V. Power, ‘The Relative 
Merits of Courts and Agencies in Competition Law – Institutional Design: Administrative Models; Judicial 
Models; And Mixed Models’, (2010) 6(1) European Competition Journal 91-127. 
119  See for an argument from a network management perspective, F. Cengiz, ‘Management of Networks 
between the Competition Authorities in the EC and the US: different polities, different designs’, (2007) 3(2) 
European Competition Journal 413-436. 
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particular ‘engineered’ institutional structure that is deemed to be legitimate in and of 












4.3. Institutional engineering and judicial legitimacy: envisioning a 
‘constitutional’ perspective 
The reliance in Vebic on and recognition of engineered architectural principles as a 
proxy of legitimate competition enforcement substantially alters the scope of traditional 
legitimacy analyses in EU competition law. In order to assess the legitimacy of a 
competition law enforcement system grounded in a decentralised application of 
supranational law, evaluation of output and input no longer offers a sufficient 
perspective. The extent to which particular engineered architecture principles have been 
implemented becomes a marker of legitimate competition enforcement in its own right. 
The direct implications of an extended legitimacy framework combining input, output 
and engineering are twofold. First and most generally, the scope of balancing 
competing policy goals grows more complicated. The long-standing debate between 
efficiency and justice now transforms into a debate about efficient and just institutions 
complementing those legitimacy prongs. As a result, institution building serves as a 
guiding device to operationalise both efficiency and justice and therefore invites in-
depth reflection on the underlying legal principles these catchwords incorporate. At the 
same time, legitimacy directly relates to institutional design. Debates on efficiency and 
justice as a result become encapsulated into institutional design arguments. Choices that 
do not fit the institutional design could as a result no longer be considered, even 
though they are thought to strike a more adequate balance between efficiency and 
justice. Since institutional principles precede efficiency and justice concerns, they 
basically become the first and foremost criteria to assess the compatibility of a national 
competition law enforcement system with the requirements of decentralised EU law 
enforcement. Second and more specifically, the creation of new legitimacy standards 
itself should be perceived as legitimate. Institutional engineering principles serve as 
judge-made ‘constitutional’ conflict standards for navigating multi-layered legal orders 
acting in close conjunction with one another. The Court is thus able directly to shape 
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enforcement.120 In so doing, it firmly establishes itself as an interlocutor with 
technocratic/economic policymakers shaping competition law output and individuals 
and firms demanding procedural input.121 Whilst the Court was already called upon to 
ensure or confirm a balance between efficiency and justice,122 engineered institutional 
architecture principles directly allow it to establish a framework that best reflects that 
balance and to control the future engineering of that process. In so doing, the Court 
posits itself at the standard-setter of both the content and the institutional structure of 
decentralised EU competition law enforcement. 
Vebic therefore firmly establishes the Court as a provider of legitimacy in relation to 
institutional arrangements in EU competition law. The Court’s newfound competences 
render the interaction between EU and national competition law structures more 
streamlined and legitimate changes in national legal orders by referring to the 
necessities of a decentralised application and enforcement system. Unjustified 
expansion of Court-induced institutional principles nevertheless generates new 
legitimacy problems of a constitutional sort. The Court’s active stance in that regard 
resuscitates evergreen questions as to whether or not the Court of Justice should 
directly make law,123 whether or not it is activist,124 whether or not it should be 
regarded as hostile or friendly towards Member States’ institutional, procedural and 
political interests125 and the extent to which it has the ultimate competence to 
determine EU law’s mandate in the national legal order.126 These matters remain the 
object of more general legitimacy discussions in EU law and require political choices on 
the distribution of authority in EU competition law to be laid bare.127 
The succinctness of the Court’s reasoning in Vebic is essentially problematic in that 
regard. In its judgment, the Court only refers to Article 35 of Regulation 1/2003 as a 
basis for requiring national institutional adaptations incorporating more adversarialism. 
As mentioned in section two, that provision does not however include such obligation 
                                                                                                                                         
120  For an analysis of the Vebic judgment’s  impact on the idea of national procedural autonomy in that respect, 
see P. Van Cleynenbreugel, note 10, 540-546. 
121  On the Court’s role as an interlocutor in the European integration enterprise, see G. F. Mancini, ‘The 
Making of a Constitution for Europe’, (1989) 26(4) Common Market Law Review 595-614. See also J. H. H. 
Weiler, ‘The Least-Dangerous Branch: A Retrospective and Prospective of the European Court of Justice in 
the Arena of Political Integration’, in J.H.H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1999, 188. 
122  See Case C-301/04 P, Commission v SGL Carbon, [2006] ECR I-5915, para 49 for an example of that balance. 
123  On the Court’s law-making role in that regard, see U. Everling, ‘On the Judge Made Law of the European 
Community’s Courts’ in D. O’Keeffe and A. Bavasso (eds.), Judicial Review in the European Union. Liber 
Amicorum in Honour of Lord Slynn of Hadley, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2000, 29-44. 
124  T. Tridimas, ‘The European Court of Justice and Judicial Activism’, (1996) 21(3) European Law Review 199-
210. More recently, see H. de Waele, ‘The Role of the European Court of Justice in the Integration Process: 
A Contemporary and Normative Assessment’, (2010) 6(1) Hanse Law Review 3-26. 
125  On that point, see S. Prechal, ‘Community law in national courts: The lessons from Van Schijndel’, (1998) 
35(3) Common Market Law Review 681-706. 
126  M. Kumm, ‘The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Constitutional Supremacy in Europe before and 
after the Constitutional Treaty’, (2005) 11(3) European Law Journal 262-307. 
127  See H. Rasmussen, ‘Between Self-Restraint and Activism: A Judicial Policy for the European Court’, (1988) 
13(1) European Law Review 28-38. 
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and could not therefore in itself serve to legitimise the Court’s ability to impose 
principles of institutional engineering on national legal orders. From that position, it 
could be inferred that the Court is illegitimately extending its competences into areas 
not directly covered by EU law. 
At the same time however, the Court has recently ventured into the institutional 
organisation of national law regimes in different fields of law as well. In cases related to 
civil procedure128 and asylum proceedings129, the Court equally considered particular 
national institutional arrangements operating in the shadow of a harmonised EU legal 
instrument comparable to Regulation 1/2003. In those cases, the Court equally derived 
procedural or institutional obligations applicable to Member States. In justifying the 
existence of these obligations however, the Court referred to both the harmonised legal 
instrument at stake and to the binding Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union and even the soon-to-be-binding ECHR.130 Advocates General equally and even 
more directly referred to these provisions.131 By invoking the constitutionally mandated 
nature of adversarialism as reflected in these charters, the Court would be able to 
impose institutional principles as a matter of fundamental rights. In doing so, the Court 
would also build on the essential fundamental rights as due process narrative underlying 
institutional adaptations at the Commission level. Since fundamental rights reflected in 
the ECHR and in the Charter have been interpreted as requiring specific adversarial 
demands in order to guarantee a fair trial, dedicated attention to these fundamental 
rights would allow the Court to tailor these adversarial requirements in the multifarious 
and sector-specific contexts of EU regulation.  
From that perspective, the Court’s legitimacy lays in the necessary operationalisation of 
fundamental rights requirements into principles of institutional organisation.132 In order 
to justify its role in that regard, the Court should refer to these fundamental rights as a 
basis for its institutional assimilation approach. Contrary to the Court’s approach in 
Vebic, a framework of institutional assimilation would therefore benefit from direct 
references to the fair trial vernacular in which assimilation operates. Only in that way 
will Vebic style judgments be grounded in a legitimate framework of judicial 
policymaking reflected in the EU’s constitutional charter.133 
                                                                                                                                         
128  Case C-279/09, Deutsche Energiehandels- und Beratungsgesellschaft mbH (DEB), nyr, judgment of 22 December 
2010, para 54. 
129  Case C-69/10, Brahim Samba Diouf v. Ministre du Travail, de l’Emploi et de l’Immigration, nyr, Judgment of 28 July 
2011, para 47-49. 
130  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, March 30, 2010, [2010] O.J. C 83/02, 389.; see 
Article 6 TEU for the mandatory accession to the ECHR system. 
131  Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi in C-279/09, DEB, para 64 and 69; Opinion of Advocate General 
Cruz Villalón in C-69/10, Samba Diouf, para 32. 
132  See on the importance of redesigning legal orders from that perspective, see M. Lasser, Judicial 
Transformations. The Rights Revolution in the Courts of Europe, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009, 341 pp. 
Lasser specifically argues that the emergence of fundamental rights results in the establishment of a more 
adversarial institutional framework. 
133  For references to the Treaties as a constitutional charter, see among others Case 294/83, Parti écologiste Les 
Verts v European Parliament, [1986] ECR 1339, para 23; Case C-2/88, Zwartveld, [1990] ECR I-3365, para 16; 
Institutional Assimilation in EU Competition Law  
  (2012) 8(3) CompLRev 312 
5. CONCLUSION 
The Court of Justice identified principles of institutional organisation in its 
interpretation of Regulation 1/2003. These principles directly enable and impose the 
institutional assimilation of diverging national competition law enforcement institutions 
into a coordinated, adversarial framework grounded in functional segregation and 
participative judicial review. Judicially-induced institutional assimilation initiatives 
complement and challenge the classical responsive ‘due process’ translation at the EU 
level and are supported by supranational institutional initiatives. The 2011 Hearing 
Officer reforms directly point towards the preference in the Commission’s institutional 
organisation for a segregated, adversarial decision-making process. In imposing similar 
principles onto the Belgian legal order in Vebic, the Court implicitly questions the 
continuing existence of integrated national agency or judicial structures that do not as 
such incorporate segregated decision-making. The Court’s approach aims to bridge the 
diversity gap between EU and national competition law enforcement structures, but at 
the same time triggers profound novel questions on what actor is or should be 
responsible for legitimising competition law enforcement in the European Union. In 
order to be perceived as legitimate, competition law itself requires principles of 
institutional organisation that enable efficiency and justice to be balanced in a 
constitutionally coherent fashion. As long as the Court does not directly refer to that 
‘constitutional necessity’, its ability to impose and further its assimilation position might 
well be in jeopardy before it truly develops into a new proxy of legitimate competition 
enforcement. 
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